Introduction

Abstract

Abolition of the slave trade was initially a British domestic concern, frequently derided elsewhere. To stop the traffic, English campaigners had to force their government to promote the cause abroad. Nineteenthcentury diplomacy wore moral questions uneasily and, for all the good advocates of Africa did, their activity made the fit still less comfortable. European cabinets faced contradictory pressures, from below and from London, neither of which they could safely ignore. Anglo-French relations between 1814 and 1848 further complicated matters. Usually, the two governments got along well enough to desire at least stability for each other. Both quickly learned the dilemma that excessive zeal against the traffic endangered the French régime, but slow progress against it could bring down a British cabinet. Frenchmen interested in the traffic, and Britons in abolition, wielded these threats to force policy modifications. British philanthropists also struggled long to change French opinion about the commerce. They helped convince their audience of the trade’s evil, but these very efforts reinforced belief across the Channel that Albion was an adept pupil of Machiavelli. Even after the French traffic ended, such mistrust could dangerously bedevil efforts at international suppression. As much as a humanitarian goal, abolition became a public relations problem. The two governments therefore danced a complicated step: Paris conceding the necessary minimum; London pressing her to keep earlier promises and perhaps give more or, only in later years, retreating in extremis; both privately exchanging information to use to appease the others population, while taking care not to embarrass their counterparts. Without the dexterity of the statesmen involved, a worthy ideal might have sparked a war on more than one occasion.