Moral Phenomenology

Abstract

The nature and role of moral experience has a central place in the history of moral philosophy. In Chapter 3, and the themes extended to some of the discussion in the previous chapters, moral experience has been discussed in the context of moral particularism. Although for the most part implicitly, the discussion has raised important questions about how to interpret and analyse moral experience which bear upon the received traditions of moral theorizing, as well as on the more local issues about how moral experience stands with regard to particularism. Towards the end of this chapter, I consider the relation between moral phenomenology and moral particularism and whether there can be phenomenological support for particularism in ethics. Overall I argue that, once properly understood, phenomenology can help clarify the positive ways in which particularism can be developed, as well as reinforce a number of criticisms that have been raised against anti- particularist positions. This chapter, then, takes a step back from the specific issues about the nature of experience as it figures in particularism, and I will spend some time discussing the place of phenomenology in moral philosophy and address some objections to the very idea that phenomenological considerations are relevant in ethics. It is worthwhile taking some time to do this before returning to the specific relation between phenomenology, moral experience and particularism. The positive ways in which particularism can be supported by characterizing moral thinking as within the space of moral reasons rely, partly, on correcting misunderstandings about the nature and role of phenomenology.