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Legislative and Judicial Decision Making in the World Trade Organization

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New Modes of Governance in the Global System

Part of the book series: International Political Economy Series ((IPES))

Abstract

There is considerable variation along the institutional dimensions of delegation, inclusiveness and publicness within the World Trade Organization (WTO), a governance arrangement with virtually universal state membership.1 Decision making in the WTO ranges from bilateral deal making in the reciprocal exchange of market access concessions, and member states deciding in multilateral consensus in the organization’s legislative branch, to third-party adjudication in the WTO’s judicial branch. The degree of delegation thus varies from a low level in rule making to a high level of delegation to WTO adjudicators. The inclusiveness of WTO governance is formally assured through consensus-based decision making, yet a country’s actual weight in determining policy outcomes is heavily influenced by the size and attractiveness of its domestic market and its dependence on foreign trade — both in the legislative and the judicial branch of the organization. Finally, publicness in WTO governance varies according to whether private actors — exporters, import-competing interests and non-governmental organizations — have access to and inform government representatives in domestic political systems. Only public officials participate in multilateral trade negotiations and WTO judicial proceedings.

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© 2006 Dirk De Bièvre

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De Bièvre, D. (2006). Legislative and Judicial Decision Making in the World Trade Organization. In: Koenig-Archibugi, M., Zürn, M. (eds) New Modes of Governance in the Global System. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372887_2

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