Abstract
In the last chapter, we said that units like ‘second’ and ‘year’ signified the same time in different possible worlds or situations, distinguishing these units from ones like ‘day’. And units like ‘second’ were said to be incapable of signifying a different time without meaning-change, while ones like ‘year’ and ’day’ were said to be capable of this. But in virtue of what do two periods, or two occurrences last the ‘same’, or a ‘different’, length of time?
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Notes
As expounded in Davidson, ‘The Individuation of Events’, in Essays on Actions and Events Oxford University Press, 1980, especially p. 179.
See J. Thomson, ‘Tasks and Super-Tasks’, in Analysis, 1954.
Ryle, ‘Heterologicality’, in Analysis, 1951.
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© 1995 Roger Teichmann
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Teichmann, R. (1995). Periods and Instants. In: The Concept of Time. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373877_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373877_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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