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Britain, Japan and Inter-War Naval Limitation, 1921–1936

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The Military Dimension

Part of the book series: The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000 ((HAJR))

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Abstract

Naval questions were one of the major issues at the heart of Anglo-Japanese relations in the inter-war period. Between 1921 and 1936, from Washington to London, naval limitation conferences, which Admiral Togo reportedly described as ‘wars without actually exchanging shells’, were focal points of this issue. They were one of the most important and time-consuming concerns for the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (UN).

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Notes

  1. Cabinet Conclusions, 50(21)3 of 16 June 1921: PRO: CAB 23/26. It can be argued, however, that the decision was more of a ‘declaration’ of intent than actually ‘initiating a programme of action’. J. Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919–1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 55–7.

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  2. Cf. CM. Bell, ‘“Our Most Exposed Outpost”: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921–1941’, Journal of Military History, vol. 60, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 61–88.

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  3. John Ferris, ‘“It is our business in the Navy to command the Seas”: the Last Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919–1929’, in K. Neilson and G. Kennedy (eds), Far Flung Lines (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 124–70.

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  4. W.R. Braisted, ‘On the American Red and Red-Orange Plans, 1919–1939’, in Gerald Jordan (ed.), Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900–1945: Essays in Honour of Arthur Marder (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 180.

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  5. A.G. Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School between the Wars’, in C. Andrew (ed.), Codebreaking and Signals Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 55–6.

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  6. C. Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941–1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), pp. 6–7.

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© 2003 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Kuramatsu, T. (2003). Britain, Japan and Inter-War Naval Limitation, 1921–1936. In: Gow, I., Hirama, Y., Chapman, J. (eds) The Military Dimension. The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378872_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378872_8

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-41915-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37887-2

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

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