The Limits of the Voluntary

Abstract

Austin’s famous remark, in my epigraph, is notable for at least two reasons. First, Austin takes it that ‘freedom’ is not something arcane and mysterious, but as near and familiar to us as voluntary action. If this is right then an adequate theory of the nature of voluntariness may well be sufficient for an adequate theory of the nature of freedom to act.

While it has been the tradition to present [freedom] as the positive term requiring elucidation, there is little doubt that to say we acted ‘freely’ … is to say only that we acted not un-freely… Like ‘real’, ‘free’ is only used to rule out the suggestion of some or all of its recognised antitheses… Aristotle has often been chidden for overlooking ‘the real problem’: in my own case, it was when I began to see the injustice of this charge that I first became interested in excuses.

J. L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57 (1956–7), pp. 1–30