Abstract
The inconclusive alliance discussions of the winter of 1958/9 left Macmillan determined to pursue an independent course of action. US contingency planning and the apparent eagerness of sections of the US military to test Soviet resolve to the brink of war had concerned the prime minister greatly. Convinced that in a real test the West would eventually compromise, he believed a way had to be found to persuade his allies that a negotiated settlement (if it preserved the Western military presence in Berlin) was preferable to brinkmanship. Macmillan was aware that British public opinion favoured negotiations and was mindful that a general election was pending. Astounding his advisers, aUies and pubUc, he decided in early 1959 to visit Moscow on a ‘voyage of discovery’ to avert a disaster1. Merely by undertaking the visit, Macmillan plunged the Western alUance into another crisis of confidence about British resolution, but the dangers were seemingly unappreciated by the prime minister once he had set his mind on an independent initiative.
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© 1998 John P. S. Gearson
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Gearson, J.P.S. (1998). The Voyage of Discovery. In: Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230380134_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230380134_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-39900-0
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