‘New Political Thinking’ and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1985–91

Abstract

Although ‘New Political Thinking’ introduced a new approach to Soviet security policy, old patterns of behaviour with regard to missile defences proved remarkably enduring. Gorbachev followed in the footsteps of his predecessors in the Kremlin in his attempts to use the ABM issue to gain concessions from Washington, in this case trying to persuade US President Ronald Reagan to end or restrict the Strategic Defense Initiative. Under Gorbachev’s leadership the Soviet missile defence research and development effort and the maintenance and modernization of the Galosh ABM system deployed around Moscow both continued on the paths set out for them in the mid-1970s with remarkably little deviation. Given the Soviet leader’s view that strategic defences undermined rather than enhanced international security, indications of any changes to the USSR’s ABM policy were very slow to appear. It took the Gorbachev leadership four years to acknowledge that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a violation of the ABM Treaty and decide to dismantle it. Resources for the missile defence programme were similarly were not targeted for cutbacks until very late in the Gorbachev period. The argument in this chapter is that Gorbachev was unable, rather than unwilling, to act on his belief that missile defences are destablizing and diminish security.