The Conceptual Framework for the Investigation of Emotions

Abstract

For a long period the experimental study of the emotions was out of bounds for neuro-psychologists and neuro-psychiatrists. Now, ‘thanks to the work of Ledoux [(1996)] and Damasio [(1994)], emotions are once again a legitimate topic for research’ (David and Halligan 2000, p. 508). However, as I shall argue, the conceptual structures with which they operate (partly inherited from William James) are misconceived.¹ Mary Phillips has recently observed that ‘there is at present no generally accepted theoretical framework for human emotion’ (Phillips et al. 2003). Philosophical analysis, properly conducted, can assist in filling this lacuna.

The article was originally published in International Review of Psychiatry, Vol. 16, No. 3 (August 2004), 199–208. The editors and publisher are grateful for the permission to republish it.