Abstract
When World War II came to a close, the United States and the Soviet Union made the decision to divide Korea following Japan’s surrender.1 This decision to separate the peninsula physically severed the common identity held by the Korean people for over 1,200 years. Since that time, the North and South have headed in different directions. While retaining some elements of a common historical and cultural identity, they have pursued radically different political and economic paths.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2000), 9.
Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 403–405. See also Oh and Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass, 12–40.
Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Taugherlini, eds., Nationalism and the Construction of the Korean Identity (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies Berkeley, 1998), 3.
See Oh and Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass, 15–21, and Gavan McCormick, Target North Korea (New York: Nation Books, 2004), 68.
Dae-Sook Suh, “Kim Jong Il and New Leadership in North Korea,” in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, eds., North Korea after Kim Il Sung (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 19.
Byung Chul Koh, “Unification Policy and North-South Relations,” in Robert A. Scalapino and Jun-Yop Kim, eds., North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983), 274–275.
Ralph N. Clough, “The Soviet Union and the Two Koreas,” in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 178, and Donald S. Zagoria, “North Korea: Between Moscow and Beijing,” in Robert A. Scalapino and Jun-Yop Kim, eds., North Korea Today, 351.
Norman Levin, “Global Detente and North Korea’s Strategic Relations,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 2 (Summer 1990): 38–40.
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981): 89.
Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 215.
Seung-Ho Joo, “The New Friendship Treaty between Moscow and Pyongyang,” Comparative Strategy 20 (2001): 467–481.
Paul Marantz, “Moscow and East Asia: New Realities and New Policies,” in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 35.
As quoted in Herbert J. Ellison, “Russia, Korea, and Northeast Asia,” in Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, eds., Korea’s Future and the Great Powers (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), 177.
Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 122–123.
For more detailed discussions of the Agreed Framework, see Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004); Victor Gilinsky, Nuclear Blackmail: The 1994 U.S.-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Agreed Framework on North Korea’s Nuclear Program (Stanford: Stanford University Press);
Terence Roehrig, “One Rogue State Crisis at a Time!” World Affairs 165 (Spring 2003): 155–178; and Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame.
For more detailed discussions of the North Korean nuclear problem, see Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003);
Terence Roehrig, From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006);
Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003);
James M. Minnich, The Denuclearization of North Korea (Bloomington, IN: 1st Books, 2002); and
James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal With North Korea,” Foreign Affairs 82 (March/April 2003): 16–30; and
Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).
Marcus Noland, “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,” Foreign Affairs 76 (July/August 1997): 105–118.
See Terence Roehrig, “Assessing North Korean Behavior: The June 2000 Summit, the Bush Administration, and Beyond,” 67–88, and Uk Heo and Chong-Min Hyun, “The ‘Sunshine’ Policy Revisited: An Analysis of South Korea’s Policy toward North Korea,” 89–103, in Uk Heo and Shale A. Horowitz, eds., Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 2003).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2007 Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, Alexander C. Tan
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Roehrig, T. (2007). North Korea in Crisis: Regime, Identity, and Strategy. In: Horowitz, S., Heo, U., Tan, A.C. (eds) Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230603134_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230603134_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-53788-4
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-60313-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)