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The Policy Significance of Nonprofit Organizations

Beyond the Limits of Failure

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Players in the Public Policy Process
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Abstract

It is remarkable that while a substantial part of the burden of dealing with social maladies, social advancement, social planning, social arbitration, political and social advocacy, and the enforcement of social laws falls on nonprofit organizations, and that many who practice in the resolution of these social problems are not economists, the principal explanations for the existence of nonprofit organizations are in economics.

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Notes

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© 2012 Herrington J. Bryce

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Bryce, H.J. (2012). The Policy Significance of Nonprofit Organizations. In: Players in the Public Policy Process. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137273925_2

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