Abstract
The overall findings of this book are that political elites are not confident that possessing nuclear weapons will ensure peace, so are reluctant to share. The frequency of outcomes in the case studies suggests that states most often do not share because of agreements between adversarial donors not to share, followed by fears that proliferation will sunder an alliance, that states will lose their influence over others, and finally because of the dangers of escalation. In terms of the presence of a nonproliferation bargain, fear of Soviet retaliation was why the US provided covert nuclear assistance to France after 1972, allowed no more than soft sharing with Japan and India, and effectively stifled Australia’s nuclear ambitions. Soviet fear of US retaliation caused its denial of sharing with Cuba and India, as well as to large parts of the anticolonial developing world. Fear of US retaliation as part of the US-China nonproliferation bargain explains China’s cutting-off of Iran and reduced sharing to Pakistan. The Beijing-Moscow nonproliferation bargain with respect to North Korea delayed Pyongyang’s nuclear aspirations for decades, and was surprisingly broken by the US’s failure to restrain Egypt from selling the first Scud missiles to North Korea, thereby setting off a spiral of missile proliferation. French concern over the reaction of other states led it to terminate its assistance to Israel, and Soviet concern over US assistance to West Germany terminated its nuclear assistance to Beijing.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
What were not tested were non-events, which are therefore cases of donors that face security threats, and would be expected to share (softly or otherwise) nuclear weapons in situations where there was no extended deterrent or nonproliferation bargain. This author has found no negative evidence to account for why sharing did not occur between Russia and Armenia, Saudi Arabia and India, or Chile and Brazil (in the 1970s), or North Korea and any other state outside of East Asia. See Philip Bleek, “Why do States Proliferate?” in William Potter and Gaukar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century — Vol. 1 The Role of Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 159–192
T.T. Poulose, Nuclear Proliferation and the Third World (New Delhi, ABC Publishing House, 1982), 9
Zhai Zhihai, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: A Chinese Perspective,” in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America (New York, Plemun Press, 1992), 165–180
Ian Bellany, Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 53
Zhai Zhihai, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: A Chinese Perspective,” in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America (NewYork: Plenum Press, 1992), 165–180
Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadows: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” in Zachary S. Davies and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 37–78
Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, no.3 (Winter 1996/1997), 54–86
James J. Wirtz, “Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War,” in T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 137–166
Carolyn James, “Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 33, no.4 (December 2000), 723–746.
Jing-dong Yuan, “India’s Rise after Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments,” Asian Survey 41, no.6 (November–December 2001), 978–1001
Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security 29, no.2, (Fall 2004), 5–49
Jack Caravelli, Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 152.
Michael Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Nuclear Capabilities in Southeast Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review 16, no.1 (March 2009), 25–45
Michael Malley, “Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in Southeast Asia 20062010,” The Nonproliferation Review 13, no.3 (November 2006), 605–615
Gordon G. Chang, Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes over the World (New York: Random House, 2006), 128
Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhram II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi Nuclear Weapons Program,” International Security 23, no.4 (Spring 1999), 148–177
George Quester, Nuclear First Strike (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 67.
Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” in Nathan Cohen, ed., Nuclear Ambitions and Issues in the Middle East (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 53–71
Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” in Nathan Cohen, ed., Nuclear Ambitions and Issues in the Middle East (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 53–71
Prominent cases of nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union: 1993: Murmansk, naval officer stole 4.5 kg of HEU; 1994: Munich airport: small amount of stolen plutonium was recovered; 1994: Prague, police seized 2.7 kg of Russian HEU; 1998: Russian police stop a plot to steal 18.5 kg of HEU from a Chelyabinsk nuclear laboratory; 2006: Oleg Khinsagov is arrested in Georgia with a small quantity of 80 per cent HEU. See Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” in Nathan Cohen, ed., Nuclear Ambitions and Issues in the Middle East (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 53–71
Mark J. Valencia, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Making Waves in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2005), 58
Ian Bellany, Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 13
Paul Levine and Ron Smith, “Arms Export Controls and Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no.6 (December 2000), 885–895
William W. Kellar, “‘Globalization’ and Nonproliferation: Security and Technology at a Crossroad?” in Janne E. Nolan, Bernard I. Finel, and Brian D. Finlay, eds., Ultimate Security, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003), 177–202
Joseph Cirincione, “Addressing Proliferation through Multilateral Agreement: Success and Failure in the Nonproliferation Regime,” in Janne E. Nolan, Bernard I. Finel, and Brian D. Finlay, eds., Ultimate Security: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003), 47–74
Christopher Clary, “A.Q. Khan, Proliferation Networks, and the Nuclear Slippery Slope,” in James Russell, ed., Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 93–114
Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” Asian Survey 41, no. 6 (November–December 2001), 1064–1086
Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 3–45
Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadows: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” in Zachary S. Davies and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 37–78
Gordon Heyd Evans, “The World of Nuclear Plenty,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 19, no.2 (February 1963), 26–30
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2014 Julian Schofield
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Schofield, J. (2014). Conclusion: Findings. In: Strategic Nuclear Sharing. Global Issues Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137298454_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137298454_14
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-45236-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-29845-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Intern. Relations & Development CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)