Being and Becoming

Abstract

Conventionally, philosophically the notions of existence — aseity — and being have been seen to be closely related in ontological concerns: What things exist? What is existence? What is it to be? Is existence a property (otherwise expressed, we might ask, is it ever appropriate to treat ‘is’ as a predicate)? Our investigation here focuses on the narrower question, what is the nature of human being, and, lest that seem too grand a project, the even narrower question, what is it necessary to say about the nature of human being as individual members of society, in order that we may formulate a theoretical expression of their relationship with society? How can we say that we have will towards ourselves and what is it so to say? At this stage, I do not intend to undertake an examination of the nature of the relationship between individuals and society, but merely of some of the necessary tools to illuminate it. I will not embark here on an investigation of the ontology of society, at least in part because I take ‘society’ to be an assemblage of relations, and I am not here interested in relations, but humans as discrete entities within societies (although it will become apparent that what it is to be a human is to be in a world of others).