Abstract
J. L. Austin, in his 1947–1959 lectures, published as Sense and Sensibilia (1962), is concerned to expose ways in which language use can mislead us into making assumptions and drawing inferences in support of otherwise indefensible philosophical conclusions. Independently of his critique of once-fashionable sense-data theories, especially in H.H. Price’s Perception (1932), A.J. Ayer’s The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940), and G.J. Warnock’s Berkeley (1953), Austin’s treatment of commonly adopted language reflecting attitudes toward the content and epistemic status of immediate sensation offers valuable insights into the exact role of experience in empirical knowledge.
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© 2014 Dale Jacquette
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Jacquette, D. (2014). Austin on Conceptual Polarity and Sensation Deception Metaphors. In: Garvey, B. (eds) J.L. Austin on Language. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137329998_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137329998_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-46078-6
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