An Aristotelian Theory of Natural Ethics

Abstract

This book is an extended argument for recognizing and embracing the intimate and powerful connections between evolved human nature and the human good. I have framed these links with Aristotle’s function argument, wherein he suggested that a good instance of any being or entity is found in the excellent expression of its nature. The evolutionary perspective allows us to deepen and extend Aristotle’s timeless and very timely ethics in ways he presaged but could not fully foresee. Aristotle’s ethics, in turn, have made it possible to reinterpret and enrich the understanding of our evolution in ways that only come into view when we look at evolution through a eudaimonic lens. I have focused on the social nature of human beings to develop a theory of the good life for human beings with respect to our evolved sociality. Our social nature is not the totality of our nature, but it is an extremely important dimension, and because it is so central, it has profound implications for the good life. I have discussed seven domains of human sociality, but even chapter-length treatments of these topics provide incomplete accounts of these important aspects of human sociality. Yet, if my argument succeeds in demonstrating that these seven domains conform to Aristotle’s function argument and his account of the good life, then that argument can be further elaborated and extended to other aspects of human nature. This reinterpretation is an attempt to bridge human nature, as it is illuminated by evolutionary science, and ethics, as envisioned by Aristotle.