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Financial Incentives and the Governance of Performance

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The Palgrave International Handbook of Healthcare Policy and Governance

Abstract

Aligning financial incentives with policy goals is becoming increasingly popu- lar in healthcare contexts (Christianson et al., 2007; Van Herck et al., 2010). This reflects a general trend over the last 15 years to treat incentives in healthcare provision more explicitly, shifting away from placing implicit trust in individuals and organizations to carry out their duties, towards actively man- aging their performance (Harrison and Smith, 2003). There are many factors which are likely to influence the way in which people respond to incentives. The literature in this area is large and growing, and much of it is concerned with financial incentives (McDonald et al., 2010). In addition to studies demonstrat- ing positive effects of changes in incentive structures, financial and otherwise (Doran et al., 2008), there is a substantial literature derived from a wide range of sectors on the potential for such performance management systems to generate unintended consequences (e.g. Tickle et al., 2011).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, UK

    Ruth McDonald (Professor of Health Science Research and Policy)

Authors
  1. Ruth McDonald
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Karolinska Institutet, Sweden

    Ellen Kuhlmann

  2. University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

    Robert H. Blank (Adjunct Professor) (Adjunct Professor)

  3. Institute of Population Health and the Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa, Canada

    Ivy Lynn Bourgeault (Professor) (Professor)

  4. University of Siegen, Germany

    Claus Wendt (Professor of Sociology of Health and Healthcare Systems) (Professor of Sociology of Health and Healthcare Systems)

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© 2015 Ruth McDonald

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McDonald, R. (2015). Financial Incentives and the Governance of Performance. In: Kuhlmann, E., Blank, R.H., Bourgeault, I.L., Wendt, C. (eds) The Palgrave International Handbook of Healthcare Policy and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137384935_24

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