Postscript: Neurophilosophy, Darwinian Naturalism, and Subjectivity

Abstract

A neurophilosophy of subjectivity is taking shape. “Neurophilosophy” as a trademarked proper name refers to the work of Patricia & Paul Churchland, but there is a whole array of contemporary research in social science and the humanities that may be designated “neurophilosophy” in a more generic sense. Bickle & Mandik (2010) distinguish between neurophilosophy and philosophy of neuroscience. The former is the application of neuroscience to philosophy while the latter concerns foundational issues within the neurosciences, i.e., concepts and methods of neuroscience. This distinction, while perfectly serviceable, is somewhat misleading. A central element of neurophilosophy is the “coevolutionary” approach, which seeks reflective equilibrium between neuroscience and philosophy. This method certainly entails doing some of what Bickle & Mandik label “philosophy of neuroscience” rather than neurophilosophy. I take the term to refer more generally to any work that is concerned with the wider conceptual significance (or lack thereof) of neurobiology for topics related to mind, person and society. Within this wider literature there is great inconsistency, disagreement, and divergence, and so neurophilosophy thus construed does not consist in any unified ontology or methodology. Large-scale currents can be discerned, however, including neurophilosophy proper (philosophy of mind, philosophy of science), neuroethics (moral psychology, meta-ethics, applied ethics), and neurophenomenology (consciousness, subjectivity, and embodiment).¹