Abstract
Nietzsche is perhaps one of the most controversial figures in Western philosophical history. This is in no small part owed to his attacks on Christianity and conventional morality, as well as his skepticism about human freedom. Nietzsche’s skeptical views of human freedom and the self might initially make him seem an unlikely candidate for providing us with a robust account of subjectivity, and his attacks on morality might similarly make him a seemingly unlikely proponent of an account of human flourishing. However, in this chapter I explore Nietzsche’s understanding of the ethics of subjectivity, showing that Nietzsche provides us with an attractive positive account of human agency, personhood, and flourishing.
Oh, wretched ephemeral race
children of chance and misery.
— Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy
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Notes
H. Frankfurt (1988), The Importance of what we Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
H. Frankfurt (1999), Necessity, Volition and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
H. Frankfurt (2006), Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right (California: Stanford University Press).
G. Watson (2004), Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (New York: Oxford University Press)
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A. Mele (1995), Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press).
See for example the collection in K. Gemes & S. May (eds) (2009), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
R. Pippin (2009), “How to Overcome Oneself: Nietzsche on Freedom,” in K. Gemes & S. May (eds), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 76.
A.O. Rorty (2005), “How to Harden your Heart: Six Easy Ways to Become Corrupt,” in A.O. Rorty (ed.), The Many Faces of Evil: Historical Perspectives (London & New York: Routledge), p. 287.
K. Gemes (2009) “Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy and the Sovereign Individual,” in K. Gemes & S. May (eds), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
R. Emerson (1983), Essays and Lectures (New York: Library of America), p. 261. [sic].
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See D. Cooper (1991), Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche’s Educational Philosophy (Great Britain: Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 4.
See a nice discussion of this in J. Kekes (2010), The Human Condition (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 34.
V. Frankl (2006), Man’s Search for Meaning. Ilse Lasche (trans. Part 1). (Boston, MA: Beacon Press), p. 74.
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F. Nietzsche (2002), Beyond Good and Evil ~ Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. J. Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 227.
R.O. Elveton (2004) “Nietzsche’s Stoicism: The Depths are Inside,” in P. Bishop (ed.), Nietzsche and Antiquity (Rochester: Camden House), p. 195.
See A. Nehamas (2001), “The Eternal Recurrence,” in J. Richardson & B. Leiter (eds), Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 123.
F. Nietzsche (2001), The Gay Science, trans. J. Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 341.
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M. Heidegger (1984), Nietzsche: Volume 2 The Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Farell Krell (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), p. 174.
R. White, (1998) “The Return of the Master: An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s ‘Genealogy of Morals’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LVIII (4), pp. 693–694.
G. Colli & M. Mazzino, (1988) Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter), 9 15 [55].
See S. May (2009) “Nihilism and the Free Self,” in K. Gemes & S. May (eds), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 89.
W. Kaufmann (1974), Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p. 101.
J. Llewelyn (1988) “Value, Authenticity and the Death of God,” in G.H.R. Parkinson (ed.), An Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge), p. 645.
N. Rodgers & M. Thompson (2005) Philosophers Behaving Badly (London and Chester Springs: Peter Owen Publishers), p. 82.
A. Schopenhauer (1914), “On Ethics, and, Contribution to the Doctrine of the Affirmation and Negation of the Will-to-Live,” in E. Belfort Bax (ed.), Selected Essays of Schopenhauer (London: G. Bell and Sons LTD), p. 263.
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Paphitis, S.A. (2015). Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual and the Ethics of Subjectivity. In: Imafidon, E. (eds) The Ethics of Subjectivity. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472427_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472427_6
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