The Naval Officer in World War Two: The Apogee

Abstract

When the Second World War broke out, the executive officer corps of the Royal Navy was in a much better condition than might have seemed possible a few years earlier. Significant weaknesses in their professional education and training had been addressed, morale was much improved from the low point of 1931–2, and significant improvements had been made in the way they were managed. However, the ultimate test of a navy is war; proof of the efficacy of the changes is in the performance of the navy in the Second World War. The final two chapters of this book examine that performance, to show that the navy, was in Professor Rodger’s words ‘fit for purpose’.¹ However, while some of the personnel and organisational failings apparent in the First World War had been addressed, it will be shown that a significant weakness remained: there was a failure to generate enough commanding officers. In part this was because far more commanding officers were to be required than could have been anticipated (for example for the enormous amphibious forces), but also because the navy did not recognise straight away that the Second World War made very different demands of its commanding officers than it had expected. However, the navy coped extremely well despite this shortcoming because it was a flexible and adaptable force which was, in turn, a reflection of the quality of its officers.