Abstract
The primary concern in this chapter is challenging the view that businessmen and liberal economic policies play a democratizing role in politics. For instance, in an analysis of the British House of Commons, Andrew Eggers and Jens Hainmueller argue that members of the Conservative Party used their political influence to obtain lucrative outside employment. Winning a seat doubled a member of parliament’s (MP) wealth over the course of a lifetime in comparison to other candidates who lost their elections.1 In a cross-national study in 47 countries, Maria Faccio estimates that politically connected firms received a cumulative abnormal return of 1.28 percent when their officers became members of parliament. These returns increased in countries with widespread corruption.2
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Notes
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© 2015 Safinaz El Tarouty
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Tarouty, S.E. (2015). Parliamentary Businessmen. In: Businessmen, Clientelism, and Authoritarianism in Egypt. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137493385_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137493385_4
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