Abstract
Subnational governments are increasingly important for the advancement of African democracy. State governments serve as mechanisms for participatory integration of ordinary people into governance and are charged with ‘the enhancement of representative grassroots democracy’ (Fajingbesi et al., 2004, 47). Subnational legislatures are endowed with the power to independently raise revenue, but they face growing duties. Given their varied obligations, what determines state legislators’ policy priorities?
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Elemo, O.M. (2015). Taxation and Determinants of Legislative Representation in Africa. In: LeVan, A.C., Fashagba, J.O., McMahon, E.R. (eds) African State Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137523341_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137523341_3
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