Abstract
Japan has a chequered past when it comes to its relationship with its neighbours in East Asia. Two hundred and more years of isolation in the Tokugawa era were followed by five decades of political intrigue and subversion, military provocation, war and colonisation. This, in turn, was followed by perhaps another forty or so years of what we may call ‘semi-isolation’, where Japan’s security was nominally guaranteed by the US in return for Japan’s promise not to possess ‘offensive’ military capabilities and thus not to engage in offensive or ‘aggressive’ wars. This relationship cut two ways and operated both at the global and regional levels: Japan providing the US with a forward base of operations from which to direct its anti-Communist activities in Asia, the US acting as guarantor of Japan’s security from Soviet invasion and continued good behaviour on behalf of its neighbours throughout the region.1
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Notes
The quote is from Strange, States and Markets, p. 45. It is possible, of course, to define ‘security’ in economic terms, which would imply some discussion of the broader benefits accruing to Japan with regard to an enhanced military role from its economic presence in East Asia. Instead, since our earlier discussion of the concept of structural power made the point that each of the four major structures of power identified by Strange is supported, joined to and held up by the other three, we will simply note the connection and move on. For discussion, see S. Harris, ‘The Economic Aspects of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region’, in D. Ball (ed.), The Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 32–51; and B. Buzan, ‘The Interdependence of Security and Economic Issues in the “New World Order” ’, in Stubbs and Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, pp. 89–102.
For a particularly clear and perceptive statement of Japan’s defence ‘problematique’ after the Cold War, but one, nevertheless, that fails to make the distinction between dominance and hegemony, see B. Buzan, ‘Japan’s Defence Problematique’, The Pacific Review, 8 (1995) 25–43.
T. Kaifu, ‘Japan’s Vision’, Foreign Policy, 80 (1990) 31–2.
See H. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: the New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, 69, 5 (1990/91) 91–106.
One tenuous but potentially potent component of this argument is that since the Japanese military was not defeated on the field of battle but by a new technology, then Japan was never really ‘defeated’ at all. Rather than the pacifism normally associated with the image of ‘Japan-as-victim’, these types of argument leave plenty of room for a resurgence of militarism into Japanese life. See R. Harvey, The Undefeated (London: Macmillan, 1994). However, the political discourse concerning the militarisation of Japan is extremely complex. For a detailed analysis see Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization.
C. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Subregional Security and Defence Linkages with ASEANs, South Korea and China, in the 1990s’, The Pacific Review, 9 (1996) 236.
On 20 March 1990, General Henry Stackpole, the then commander of the Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, earned his place in history by suggesting that the US forces in Japan were the ‘cap in the bottle’ preventing the re-emergence of Japanese military power. For a recent argument to the effect that the US is maintaining its high military spending in preparation for a possible conflict with either or both Russia and China, see G. Achcar, ‘The Strategic Triad: The United States, Russia and China’, New Left Review, 228 (1998) 91–127.
C. Weinberger, ‘US Defense Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, 64, 4 (1986) 675–97.
US Department of Defense, The Strategic Framework of the Asian-Pacific Region: Looking Towards the 21st Century, April 1991.
Of the approximately 100000 US troops in the region, the aim is to station 40000 in Japan, 37000 in Korea and the remainder at sea with the Seventh Fleet. For the controversial presence of US servicemen and their families in Japan, a subject to which we return below, see C. Johnson, ‘Go-Banken-Sama, Go Home!’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July–August 1996, pp. 22–5 and 27–9.
The figure includes dependants, numbering approximately 23000. See The Economist, 7–13 October 1995, p. 94; 21–27 October 1995, pp. 93–4; 28 October–3 November 1995, pp. 95–6; and J. Gerson, ‘“I Refuse”’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July–August 1996, p. 26. In November 1995, Richard Macke, the then commander of US forces in the Pacific, was forced to resign after saying that the rape could have been avoided if only the marines had hired a prostitute instead. Reported in The Economist, 25 November–1 December 1995, p. 6. On the issue of Japanese maintenance of US forces in Japan see Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization, pp. 62–4.
On 17 April 1996, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto signed an agreement declaring, amongst other things, that the US would reduce its presence in Okinawa. The fact that US troops will be moved (at Japanese expense) to other areas of Japan means that far from being solved the problem has been, for the moment, simply swept under the carpet. The Japanese Defence Agency contributed $1.8bn to the overall costs of US forces in Japan in 1998. IISS, The Military Balance, 1998/99 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1998), p. 167.
Under the law, participating SDF personnel are only permitted to wear side-arms for personal protection, must withdraw from areas of conflict, may not be dispatched to an area where hostilities are in progress (and indeed may not be dispatched at all in the absence of the assent of all the parties to the conflict), and they must observe strict ‘neutrality’ at all times. Be that as it may, on the ground SDF personnel have sometimes found it difficult to adhere to the letter of the law. For brief details of SDF activities in each country named see M. Itoh, ‘Expanding Japan’s Role in the United Nations’, The Pacific Review, 8 (1995) 283–302.
The corresponding figures for the US have held steady at 25 and 30 per cent, although Washington has been attempting to reduce its level of commitment to 20 and 25 per cent respectively — much closer to Japanese levels. Figures from SIPRI, Yearbook 1997, pp. 49–50; and IISS, The Military Balance, 1997/98, p. 166. See also E. Luck, ‘Layers of Security: Regional Arrangements, The United Nations, and the Japanese-American Security Treaty’, Asian Survey, 35 (1995) 237–52.
See SIPRI, Yearbook 1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 533–44.
See, inter alia, M. Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1990). We discuss this below.
See T. Akaha, ‘Japan’s Comprehensive Security Policy’, Asian Survey, 31 (1991) 324–40; and Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN.
Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization, p. 50; and M. Alagappa, ‘Japan’s Political and Security Role in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 10 (1988) 31.
P. Kerr, ‘The Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific’, The Pacific Review, 7 (1994) 402. The following discussion draws heavily from this article. The ASEAN-PMC comprises the ten ASEAN states (Singapore, 1967; Malaysia, 1967; Indonesia, 1967; Thailand, 1967; the Philippines, 1967; Brunei, 1984; Vietnam, 1995; Myanmar/Burma and Laos, 1997; Cambodia 1999); seven ‘dialogue partners’ (the US, Canada, Australia, Japan, the EU, South Korea and New Zealand); one ‘observer’ (Papua New Guinea); and two ‘guests’ (China and Russia). The dates in parentheses indicate the year of accession to ASEAN membership: hence, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia played no part in these discussions.
Ibid. See also Y. F. Khong, ‘ASEAN’s Post-Ministerial Conference and Regional Forum: A Convergence of Post-Cold War Security Strategies’, in P. Gourevitch et al. (eds), United States-Japan Relations and International Institutions After the Cold War (San Diego: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 37–58.
See Q. K. Wang, ‘Toward Political Partnership: Japan’s China Policy’, The Pacific Review, 7 (1994) 171–82.
For a view from the US, see G. Rozman, ‘A Regional Approach to Northeast Asia’, Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 39, 1 (1995) 65–80.
D. Arase, ‘Japanese Policy Toward Democracy and Human Rights in Asia’, Asian Survey, 33 (1993) 938.
The Japan Institute of International Affairs is a member of another important Track Two organisation, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, in the realisation of which Japan played a significant part. For details, see P. Evans, ‘Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)’, The Pacific Review, 7 (1994) 125–39.
For discussion, see P. Katzenstein and N. Okawara, ‘Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies’, and T. Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism’, both in International Security, 17, 4 (1993) 84–118 and 119–50 respectively.
See D. Kelly, ‘The Asssociation of Southeast Asian Nations’, in G. Hook and I. Kearns (eds), Subregionalism and World Order (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 169–95.
See A. Acharya, ‘Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: from the “ASEAN Way” to the “Asia-Pacific Way”’, The Pacific Review, 10 (1997) 319–46.
Japanese Defence Agency, Defence of Japan, 1994, pp. 144–7.
Reported in Japanese Defence Agency, Defence of Japan, 1996 (electronic version).
Japanese Defence Agency, Defence of Japan, 1994, p. 140.
Japanese Defence Agency, Defence of Japan, 1996.
For a broader view, see W. Hu, ‘China’s Security Agenda After the Cold War’, The Pacific Review, 8 (1995) 117–35.
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© 2002 Dominic Kelly
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Kelly, D. (2002). Mapping Japan’s Role in East Asia: Security. In: Japan and the Reconstruction of East Asia. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403905307_7
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