Abstract
The middle of March 2001 witnessed the long awaited physical disengagement of the belligerents fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as envisioned in the Lusaka Agreement. This in turn allowed the deployment of half of the promised 5,537 peacekeeping forces organized as the Mission d’Organisation Nations Unis au Congo (United Nations Mission to the Congo—MONUC). The deployment of the MONUC forces followed a tortuous wait by the belligerent African countries, who that had to sign a ceasefire twice in order to persuade an extremely reluctant UN to intervene.1 These developments were taking place against the backdrop of the assassination of President Laurent Désiré Kabila on 16 January 2001 in Kinshasa, whereupon his son, Joseph, succeeded him. Joseph Kabila’s approach to international relations had clearly breathed new life into the process.2 In February 2001, the African belligerent states met at the United Nations, signaling their renewed desire for peace, and practically begged the UN Security Council to authorize the deployment of peacekeepers.
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Notes
This has since been called into question as President Paul Kagame announced an unequivocal decision to remain in the DRC for security reasons at the April 2001 commemoration of the genocide event. See, “Rwanda Threatens Not to Withdraw from DRC,” The Daily News (Harare), 9 April 2001.
Mahmood Mamdani, “Rwanda Rebels Aren’t Going to Win this Time,” quoted in Electronic Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, SA, August 14, 1998, accessed at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98aug1/14aug-congo.html (8 February 2001).
Paul Omach, “The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests,” African Affairs 99 (2000): 81.
Statement by Commander Jean Pierre Ondakane. See “The Mystery Man in Charge of Congo’s Rebels,” in Electronic Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, SA, 18 August 1999, 1, accessed at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99aug18-congo.html (5 February 2001).
Mamhood Mamdani, “Rwandan Rebels Aren’t Going to Win This Time,” Human Rights Watch, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Casualties of War,” 11, no.1 (A) (February 1999): 3, accessed at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/congo/Congoweb.htm.
“The Mystery Man in Charge of Congo’s rebels.”
Many analysts on the DRC tend to overlook the central role played by Burundi as part of the Rwanda-Uganda axis.
Article 4 of the Declaration of the Treaty of SADC (1992) provides for military assistance or obligations to member states. See also Michael Nest, “Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in African Affairs, 100 (July 2001): 470–73.
This is a body, operating below the Summit of Heads of States and Government, made up of foreign, defense, and security ministers as well as army chiefs of all the SADC member states.
See the controversial convergence of U.S. and Uganda policies on the African continent in the well-argued piece by Omach, “The African Crisis Response Initiative,” 73–95.
As a result of the military relations, Hawk Aircraft—later to be used extensively in the DRC war—were acquired from Britain, artillery and tanks from Korea, and Cascavel Armoured Cars from Brazil. Sadly, relations of the ZDF with the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT), were terminated—as at the end of March 2001—in the midst of political recriminations between Zimbabwe and Britain.
This was during the dissident era and subsequent deployments in Matebeleland.
Against RENAMO and South African Defence Forces Units deployed in Mozambique at the time.
The forces participated in Somalia, Angola, and Rwanda.
On Angola’s goals and stakes in the conflict, see chapter 5 in this volume.
BBC World News, 9 September 1998, published at GMT 11:56, accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid/167000/167635.stm (5 February 2005).
Electronic Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, SA, 17 August 1998, 1, accessed at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98aug2/17aug-congo2.html (2 February 2001).
“Zim. Sends Two More Battalions to Congo.” Also see Group Captain Chingono, Air Power Superiority in the DRC Conflict,” in The Air Force Magazine 2, no.1 (May 2000), 8–9; and Flight Lieutenant Charles Mazorodze, “Initial Technical Operational Experience in the DRC,” in The Air Force Magazine 2, no.1 (May 2000), 10.
While Uganda quickly acknowledged the involvement of its armed forces, it took Rwanda until November to confirm what had by then become common knowledge. During this phase, SADC allied forces benefited from their overt deployment and tactical operations against the furtive and poorly concealed activities of Rwanda and Uganda. It was only in November 1998 that Rwanda finally admitted to its presence in the DRC, and after that, the gloves were off. After November, the regular forces of the six belligerent armies were involved.
The fact that elements of his own forces were a major threat to his security is testified to by his assassination on 16 January 2001.
“World: Africa: Kinshasa Four Days From Starvation,” BBC News, 9 September 1998, published GMT 11 56, accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_167000/167635.stm (5 February 2001).
This is generally referred to as “Kisingani I” in Kampala. Before March 2001, there were to be two subsequent battles, called “Kisingani II” and “Kisangani III,” pitting the two “allies” fighting inside the DRC against one another.
In September 1999, a predominantly urban-based labor-supported opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was established Within a year this clinched fifty-seven seats against the ruling party’s sixty-two seats in parliamentary elections held in June 2000.
This development was unfortunate in our view. The main reason for the country’s involvement in the DRC is the noble cause of Pan Africanism, and this should have informed crossparty behavior to result in the solid support of Joseph Kabila and his efforts to bring about peace in the DRC.
Already by 28 August 1998, “Zimbabwe Had Sent in Two More Battalions to Congo” as reported in Electronic Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, SA., accessed at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98aug-zim_congo2.html (21 February 2001). According to this report, the two battalions were drawn from the Kwekwe-based Fifth Brigade and a unit of Cascavel armored vehicles flown from Manyame airbase by Angola’s Russian-made troop carriers.
Current U.S. dollar denominated field allowances are being paid in a Z dollar equivalent as the country has exhausted its foreign currency reserves.
Constantine Chimakure, “Zimbabwe Out of DRC by May,” The Zimbabwe Mirror (Harare weekly) 6–12 April 2001, 3. At that time, U.S.$1 equaled approximately Z$55. Thus, the minister was acknowledging an expenditure of over U.S $182 million.
3rd Session of the 4th Parliament of Zimbabwe, Third Report of the Departmental Committee on Security Ministries, presented to the House on 24 March 1998 (SC2–1998).
Michael Nest, “Ambitions, Profits and Loss,” 470.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that new Landrovers and Toyota Landcruisers deployed in the DRC became completely worn out within two months of deployment on average as a result of the harsh operational terrain in the DRC. These weapons are the popular machine-gun platform and close support vehicles for armored cars in the urban areas used in many conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. Interviews of the author with returning soldiers, Harare, Zimbabwe, 1999.
Unconfirmed reports assert that in attempting to keep British-purchased Hawk aircraft airworthy, Zimbabwe has had to approach middlemen in Kenya in order to circumvent the sanctions imposed by the U.K. This is likely to further increase the costs.
Editorial, The Namibian Defence Force Journal 12, no. 10 (May–July 2001): 1.
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© 2002 John F. Clark
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Rupiya, M.R. (2002). A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe’s Involvement in the Second Congo War. In: Clark, J.F. (eds) The African Stakes of the Congo War. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982445_6
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