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Static Games

  • Reference work entry
Computational Complexity

  • 238 Accesses

Article Outline

Glossary

Definition of the Subject

Introduction

Nash Equilibrium

Existence

Mixed Strategies

Equilibrium in Beliefs

Correlated Equilibrium

Rationality, Correlated Equilibrium and Equilibrium in Beliefs

Bayesian Games

Evolutionary Stable Strategies

Future Directions

Bibliography

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The war of attrition was analyzed in Maynard Smith [14]. For an analysis of the asymmetric information version of the war of attrition, see Krishna and Morgan [13].

Abbreviations

Player:

A participant in a game.

Action set:

The set of actions that a player may choose.

Action profile:

A list of actions, one for each player.

Payoff:

The utility a player obtains from a given action profile.

Bibliography

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ben‐Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel

    Oscar Volij

Authors
  1. Oscar Volij
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag

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Volij, O. (2012). Static Games. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Computational Complexity. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_188

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