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Game Theory and Strategic Complexity

  • Reference work entry
Computational Complexity

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Article Outline

Glossary

Definition of the Subject

Introduction

Games, Automata and Equilibrium Concepts

Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games

Complexity and Bargaining

Complexity, Market Games and the Competitive Equilibrium

Discussion and Future Directions

Acknowledgments

Bibliography

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Abbreviations

Game theory:

A formal model of interaction, usually in human behavior.

Repeated games:

A series of identical interactions of this kind.

Strategy:

A complete specification of how a player will play the game.

Strategic complexity:

A measure of how complex a strategy is to implement.

Equilibrium:

A solution concept for games in which each player optimizes given his correct prediction of others' behavior.

Equilibrium path:

The outcome in terms of the play of the game if every player uses his equilibrium strategy.

Continuation game:

A description of how the play will proceed in a dynamic game once some part of the game has already occurred.

Automata:

A formal definition of a strategy that captures its complexity.

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Acknowledgments

We wish to thank an anonymous referee and Jihong Lee for valuable comments that improved the exposition of this chapter. We would also like to thank St. John's College, Cambridge and the Pennsylvania State University for funding Dr Chatterjee's stay in Cambridge at the time this chapter was written.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, USA

    Kalyan Chatterjee

  2. Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

    Hamid Sabourian

Authors
  1. Kalyan Chatterjee
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  2. Hamid Sabourian
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

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Chatterjee, K., Sabourian, H. (2012). Game Theory and Strategic Complexity. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Computational Complexity. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_80

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