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Political Ideology in the Bureaucracy

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  • First Online:
Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance

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Synonyms

Agency ideal points; Agency ideology; Agency preferences; Bureaucratic ideal points; Policy preferences of bureaucrats

Definition

Political ideology in the bureaucracy (def.). A condensed representation of the policy preferences held by individuals or groups of individuals (e.g., agencies) tasked with carrying out the orders of policymakers.

Introduction

In political science, research studying the public bureaucracy has focused heavily on whether public bureaucrats prioritize their own ideological goals over politicians’ policy directives (Miller 2005). In public administration, scholarship has examined whether public bureaucrats passively (via shared personal traits) or actively (via the pursuit of shared ideological aims) represent the communities they serve (Lim 2006; Meier 1975; Meier and Nigro 1976; Krislov 1974). By concentrating on these topics, research has moved ideology to the heart of the conversation about public bureaucracy. Yet, in so doing, these literatures...

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

    Jowei Chen

  2. Atkinson Graduate School of Management and Center for Governance and Public Policy Research, Willamette University, 900 State Street, Salem, OR, 97301, USA

    Tim Johnson

Authors
  1. Jowei Chen
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  2. Tim Johnson
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tim Johnson .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida, USA

    Ali Farazmand

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© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Chen, J., Johnson, T. (2016). Political Ideology in the Bureaucracy. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_2473-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_2473-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5

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