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Anthropomorphism

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Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior

Anthropomorphism has for most of the last century been considered a grievous sin in the study of animal behavior. Simply put, anthropomorphism is the attribution of human characteristics to nonhuman entities. It is often erroneously applied only to other animals using terms in describing and interpreting their behavior that derive from human psychology and behavior. Originally, however, it was applied by theologians and philosophers to viewing gods and other supernatural entities as possessing human-like emotions, thoughts, and motivations along with additional supernatural capabilities. The famous painting by Michelangelo in the Sistine Chapel of a white-haired Caucasian grandfather figure touching Adam epitomizes this approach, along with claims that God is jealous, gets angry, loves us as a parent, and so on. While many philosophers and theologians opposed such attributions to spiritual beings, their admonitions hold little sway with most religious people who want a personal god...

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Correspondence to Gordon M. Burghardt .

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Burghardt, G.M. (2017). Anthropomorphism. In: Vonk, J., Shackelford, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47829-6_1042-1

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