Abstract
This article summarises theoretical studies on asylum provision in multi-country settings. The common feature of their models is the assumption that asylum-related policies of safe countries generate cross-border externalities. The presence of externalities results in inefficiently low provision of asylum. The studies explore ways to increase asylum provision to the efficient level, but reveal more difficulties than a solution.
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Acknowledgment
I received useful comments and helpful suggestions from two anonymous referees. All remaining errors are mine.
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Tamura, Y. (2018). International Coordination in Asylum Provision. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_3029
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_3029
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